Abstract. This paper deals with the application of Stackelberg-Nash strategies to the control of parabolic equations. We assume that we can act on the system through a hierarchy of controls. A first control (the leader) is assumed to choose the policy. Then, a Nash equilibrium pair (corresponding to a noncooperative multiple-objective optimization strategy) is found; this governs the action of the other controls (the followers). The main novelty in this paper is that, this way, we can obtain the exact controllability to a prescribed (but arbitrary) trajectory. We study linear and semilinear problems and, also, problems with pointwise constraints on the followers.
Introduction
In classical control theory, we usually find a state equation or system and one control with the mission of achieving a predetermined goal. Frequently (but not always), the goal is to minimize a cost functional in a prescribed family of admissible controls.
A more interesting situation arises when several (in general, conflictive or contradictory) objectives are considered. This may happen, for example, if the cost function is the sum of several terms and it is not clear how to average. It can also be expectable to have more than one control acting on the equation. In these cases, we are led to consider multi-objective control problems.
In contrast with the mono-objective case, various strategies for the choice of good controls can appear, depending of the characteristics of the problem. Moreover, these strategies can be cooperative (when the controls mutually cooperate in order to achieve some goals) or noncooperative. Keywords There exist several equilibrium concepts for multi-objective problems, with origin in game theory, mainly motivated by economics. Each of them determines a strategy. Thus, let us mention the noncooperative optimization strategy proposed by Nash [16] , the Pareto cooperative strategy [17] and the Stackelberg hierarchical-cooperative strategy [21] .
In the context of the control of PDEs, a relevant question is whether one is able to steer the system to a desired state (exactly or approximately) by applying controls that correspond to one of these strategies. Up to date, there has been some work on the subject:
• The papers by Lions [14, 15] , where the author gives some results concerning Pareto and Stackelberg strategies, respectively.
• The paper by Díaz and Lions [4] , where the approximate controllability of a system is established following a Stackelberg-Nash strategy and the extension in Díaz [3] , that provides a characterization of the solution by means of Fenchel-Rockafellar duality theory.
• The papers [18, 19] , where Ramos et al. study Nash equilibria from the theoretical and numerical viewpoints for linear parabolic PDEs and for the Burgers equation.
• Finally, let us mention that the Stackelberg-Nash strategy for the Stokes systems has been studied by Guillén-González et al. in [11] .
The controllability issues considered in these works only provide answers at the approximate level. This means that the main results assert that one can lead the system to a state that is arbitrarily close (but not identical) to a desired target.
The main novelty of the present paper is to extend the analysis and the results to an exact controllability framework.
The problems and their motivations
Let Ω ⊂ R N be a bounded domain whose boundary Γ is regular enough. Let T > 0 be given and let us consider the cylinder Q = Ω × (0, T ), with lateral boundary Σ = Γ × (0, T ). In the sequel, we will denote by C a generic positive constant. Sometimes, we will indicate the data on which C depends by writing C(Ω), C(Ω, T ), etc. The usual norm and scalar product in L 2 (Ω) will be respectively denoted by · and (·, ·). We are interested in the proof of the exact controllability to the trajectories of a multi-objective parabolic PDE problem in Q, where we apply a Stackelberg-Nash strategy. For simplicity, we will assume that only three controls are applied (one leader and two followers), but very similar considerations hold for systems with a higher number of controls.
We will consider systems of the form ⎧ ⎨ 
⊂ Ω be open sets, representing observation domains for the followers. We will consider the (secondary) functionals
and
2. Let us fix an uncontrolled trajectory of (1.1), that is, a sufficiently regular solution to the system
Once the Nash equilibrium has been identified and fixed for each f , we look for a controlf 8) subject to the restriction of exact controllability
Several motivations can be found for control problems of this kind:
• If y = y(x, t) is viewed as a temperature distribution in a body, we interpret that our intention is to drive y to a desired y at time T by heating and cooling (acting only on the small subdomains O, O 1 and O 2 ), trying at the same time to keep reasonable temperatures in O 1,d and O 2,d during the whole time interval (0, T ).
• The same control strategy makes sense in the context of fluid mechanics. Thus, we can replace (1.1) and (1.7) by similar Stokes and/or Navier-Stokes systems and we can look for controlsf and associated Nash equilibria (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfying (1.8)-(1.9). In this case, it is assumed that we act on the system through mechanical forces applied on O, O 1 and O 2 and the goal is to reach y at time T keeping the velocity field y not too far from
• In the framework of mathematical finance, this can also be an interesting question. For instance, it is well known that the price of an European call option is governed by a backward PDE similar to (1.1). Now, the independent variable x must be interpreted as the stock price and t is in fact the reverse of time (we fix a situation at t = T and we want to know what to do in order to arrive at this situation from a well chosen state). In this regard, it can be interesting to control the solution of the system with the composed action of several agents, each of them corresponding to a different range of values of x. For further information on the modeling and control of phenomena of this kind, see for instance [2, 20, 22] .
The main results
We will have to impose the following assumption:
Accordingly, we will denote these sets by O d ; see below, in Section 5, some comments on the necessity of the hypothesis (1.10).
In the linear case (F ≡ 0), the exact controllability to the trajectories is equivalent to the null controllability property. The following result holds: 
such that the corresponding solutions to (1.1) satisfy (1.9).
Roughly speaking, the assumption on the μ i means that the followers must have moderate L 2 norms. On the other hand, the assumption (1.11) means that both y 1,d and y 2,d approach y as t → T .
In the semilinear case, with F being a locally Lipschitz-continuous function, we can consider the same controllability questions. However, it is important to note that, in this case, we lose the convexity of the functionals J i and the Nash equilibrium condition (1.4) is not necessarily equivalent to (1.5) and (1.6). For this reason, it is convenient to weaken the definition of equilibrium as follows:
is called a Nash quasi-equilibrium of (1.1)-(1.2) associated to f if the conditions (1.5) and (1.6) are satisfied.
For the semilinear case, we have the following result: A natural question is whether there are semilinear systems for which the concepts of Nash equilibrium and Nash quasi-equilibrium are equivalent. An answer is given by the following result:
the conditions (1.4) and (1.5)-(1.6) are equivalent.
In this paper, we also analyze if a result like Theorem 1.1 holds true when the followers are constrained to belong to appropriate convex sets
. Thus, let I 1 and I 2 be two nonempty closed intervals with 0 ∈ I 1 ∩ I 2 , let us take 12) and let us suppose that the minimization of J 1 and J 2 in (1.4) is subject to the restrictionsv
The controllability result is the following: 
As mentioned above, the main novelty of this paper is that we deal with exact and not approximate controllability. There are other points that distinguish our contribution as well. Thus, contrarily to what was imposed in other previous papers (see for instance [11] ), we do not make any assumption on the open sets O i . In particular, the O i can be disjoint of O, which is obviously the most interesting situation. On the other hand, the analysis and results also hold, after appropriate modifications, for m followers with m > 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we prove Theorem 1.1, which concerns the linear case. This result will be strongly used in the other sections. In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1.3 and Proposition 1.4. As a consequence, we see that the Stackelberg-Nash strategy can be applied to nonlinear problems and, also, that under adequate hypotheses on F , we still obtain a Nash equilibrium. Section 4 deals with the proof of Theorem 1.5. Finally, we present some additional comments and questions in Section 5.
The linear case
In this section we prove Theorem 1.1. The proof is long and, for clarity, has been decomposed in two parts. In Section 2.1 we will recall the existence, uniqueness and characterization of a Nash equilibrium (for fixed but arbitrary f ); then, in Section 2.2, we will prove the desired controllability result.
Thanks to the linearity of the problem, we may reduce the exact controllability to the trajectories to a null controllability property. In fact, after the change of variable y = z +y, it is immediate to see from (1.1) and (1.7), with F ≡ 0, that z is the solution to the problem ⎧ ⎨
Also, we can write the functionals J i in (1.2) in terms of z, which gives
where
Nash equilibrium
In this subsection, we will recall an existence/uniqueness result concerning a Nash equilibrium, in the sense of (1.4), for any f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )). We will also recall a result which characterizes this Nash equilibrium in terms of the solution to an adjoint system. These results are due to Díaz and Lions (see [3, 4, 15] ).
For the moment, we do not have to impose the assumption (1.10). This requirement only appears later, in Section 2.2, when the choice of f has to be made. Accordingly, in this section we keep the notation O i,d (i = 1, 2).
Existence and uniqueness

Let us introduce the spaces H
By definition, for any control f , the pair (v 1 , v 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (1.5) and (1.6), that is to say,
where w i is the derivative of z with respect to
Therefore, we may rewrite (2.3) in the form
Then, the task is to prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution for the equation
In this direction, the following holds:
Proposition 2.1. Let us assume that
Proof. From (2.4) and Young's inequality, we observe that
Hi .
Therefore,
. Now, let us introduce the bilinear form a : H × H → R, with
From the definition of the operator L and the inequality (2.8), we readily see that a(·, ·) is continuous and coercive on H. Consequently, the Lax-Milgram's Theorem implies that, for any Φ ∈ H , there exists exactly one
In particular, we get (2.5) and the proof is done.
From the proof, it becomes clear that, under the assumptions of Proposition 2. 9) where the constant
. These estimates will be used below. Notice that, in view of (2.9), the state z associated to f and (
where C is as above.
Characterization of the Nash equilibrium
We will express the followers v 1 (f ) and
∈ H, let us consider the associated state z (the solution for (2.1)). In view of (2.3), it is very natural to introduce the adjoint states φ i (i = 1, 2), with
Using integration by parts, we see that (v 1 , v 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
This directly implies that
Let us gather all these informations in the same system. We obtain the following:
Recall that our main objective is to prove the null controllability of z at time t = T . Therefore, the task is to find a distributed control f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )) such that the solution to (2.11) satisfies (2.2).
Null controllability
In this subsection, we will achieve the proof of Theorem 1.1. We will establish an observability inequality for the system 12) which can be viewed as the adjoint of (2.11). This will suffice. This observability estimate is given in the following result:
, the following inequality holds true for the solution (ψ, γ i ) of (2.12):
Let us assume for a moment that Proposition 2.2 holds and let us prove the controllability result in Theorem 1.1. From a well known duality argument, we have that, for any z 14) where (z, φ 1 , φ 2 ) and (ψ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) are the solutions to (2.11) and (2.12), respectively associated to z 0 and ψ T . Thus, to prove the null controllability property is equivalent to find, for each z
There are several ways to show that (2.13) implies the existence of such a control. They rely on well known arguments. For completeness, let us sketch one of them. For each > 0, let us consider the following functional:
It is then clear that F : L 2 (Ω) → R is continuous and strictly convex. Moreover,
where C andρ are furnished by Proposition 2.2. Consequently, F is also coercive in L 2 (Ω). Note that, here, we have used the assumption (1.11) on
Let ψ T be the unique minimizer of F . Then, either ψ T = 0 or
Suppose that ψ T = 0. In this case, we have
where we have denoted by (ψ , γ 1 , γ 2 ) the solution to (2.12) corresponding to ψ T = ψ T . Taking f = f := ψ 1 O×(0,T ) in (2.14), denoting by z the associated state and comparing to (2.15), we see that
On the other hand, from (2.13) and (2.15) we also have 0, T ) ). Obviously, we also have (2.16) and (2.17) when ψ T = 0 and we take f = 0. In view of these inequalities, we can easily deduce a uniform estimate for z . Then, taking limits as → 0, we conclude that null controllability holds. This ends the proof of Theorem 1.1. 8)-(1.9) . This claim can be justified as follows:
1. For each > 0, there exists exactly one minimal L 2 norm control f such that the associated state, i.e. the corresponding solution to (2.11), satisfies (2.16). 2. From the weak lower semicontinuity of the terms in F , it is clear that any weak limit of a subsequence of {f } minimizes the L 2 norm in the family of the null controls for z. Consequently, this is the case for f . Now, we will give the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
The assumption (1.10) will be used here.
Such a function η 0 always exists (see [7] ).
Let us introduce the weight functions
and the notation
From the usual Carleman inequalities (see [5, 7, 13] ), we have: 
for all large s and λ and some C only depending on Ω, ω and T . We can observe that, in ω × (0, T ), one has h = −ψ t − Δψ + aψ. Consequently, by introducing an appropriate cut-off function ζ and integrating by parts, we get 
Now, let us introduce = (t), with
/2, t(T − t) for T /2 ≤ t ≤ T, and the functions
Let us denote byĪ m (ψ) the right-hand side of (2.19) with σ and ξ repectively replaced byσ andξ. Then, arguing as in ( [6] , Lem. 1), it is not difficult to see from (2.23) and the PDEs satisfied by ψ and the γ i that there exists a constant C > 0, such that 
Thus, from Gronwall's Lemma and the fact that γ i (x, 0) ≡ 0, it follows that
Since the right-hand side of (2.26) is bounded up to a multiplicative constant byĪ 3 (ψ), in view of (2.25) and (2.26), we find that
which implies (2.13). This ends the proof.
Remark 2.4.
If, instead of (1.10), we assume that the main hypothesis in [11] , namely
is satisfied, the same result holds. Indeed, multiplying the second PDE in (2.12) by γ i and integrating Ω × (0, t), we get
Consequently, by Gronwall's Lemma and (2.28), it follows that
By replacing this inequality in the first term on the right-hand side of (2.20) and arguing again as in ( [6] , Lem. 1) we obtain
This last inequality, together with (2.26), gives (2.27).
The semilinear case
In this section, we will analyze the controllability of a more general model, with a not necessarily vanishing function F . Our goals are to prove Theorem 1.3 and Proposition 1.4.
Characterization of Nash quasi-equilibria
As already mentioned in Section 1, in the semilinear case, the convexity of the functionals J i is not guaranteed. Consequently, it is not clear whether the definition of Nash equilibria used in the linear case is the good one. For this reason, we must re-define the concept of Nash optimality (recall Def. 1.2).
Notice that (1.5)-(1.6) is equivalent to 
Let us introduce the adjoint systems
Then, a short computation shows that (3.1) can be written equivalently as follows:
As a consequence, we get the following characterization of any Nash quasi-equilibrium:
In this way, we have the following optimality system: 
Proof of Theorem 1.3
The Proof of Theorem 1.3 follows some arguments that are nowadays standard and rely on the ideas introduced in [7, 23] . It is divided in three steps: first, we perform a change of variable that reduces the task to solve a null controllability problem; then, this is rewritten as a fixed-point equation in L 2 (Q); in particular, we use again Carleman inequalities and energy estimates to deduce an observability inequality for the adjoint of a linearized system; finally, in a third step, we use some compactness properties of the system and we prove the existence of a fixed-point.
Step 1. We must find a leader control f ∈ L 2 (O×(0, T )) such that the solution (y, φ 1 , φ 2 ) to (3.3) satisfies (1.9). In fact, by introducing the change of variable z = y − y, we can rewrite (3.3) in the form
In this way, obviously, what we have to prove is the null controllability for z in (3.4).
Step
(3.5)
By hypothesis, there exists K > 0 such that
Note that, arguing as in Section 2.1, it can be proved that, if μ 1 and μ 2 are sufficiently large, (3.5) possesses exactly one solution for each f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )). Furthermore, one has
, where w z is the state associated to the minimal L 2 norm null control f z for the linear system (3.5). In other words, w z is, together with φ The goal is now to prove the null controllability of (3.5) . To this purpose, we will make use again of a suitable global Carleman inequality for the solutions to the adjoint system, that is,
In the context of (3.7), we have the following: 
The proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 2.2 and, for brevity, is omitted. This result leads, as in Section 2.2, to the existence of a minimal norm null control f z ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )) for (3.5). Furthermore it is clear that there exists a positive constant C, only depending on
This argument proves that Λ is well defined.
Step 3. Taking into account (3.6) and (3.8), we see that w z is uniformly bounded in L 2 (0, T ; H 1 0 (Ω)) and w z,t is uniformly bounded in L 2 (0, T, H −1 (Ω)). In view of the classical Aubin-Lions' Compactness Theorem, this means that Λ maps the whole space L 2 (Q) into a compact set. On the other hand, the mapping z → Λ(z) is obviously continuous. Therefore, we can use Schauder's Fixed-Point Theorem to ensure the semilinear controllability result. This ends the Proof of Theorem 1.3.
Equilibria and quasi-equilibria
The aim of this subsection is to prove Proposition 1.4, that is, to investigate whether, in the semilinear case, we may have a Nash equilibrium. Let us show that the answer is positive at least when 0, T ) ) be given and let (v 1 , v 2 ) be the associated Nash quasi-equilibrium. Note that, for any s ∈ R and (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ H,
where 
and we have used the notation y = y s | s = 0 and p = p s | s = 0 . Let us introduce the adjoint of (3.11)
and let us also set φ = φ s | s = 0 . Replacing (3.12) into (3.9) and using integration by parts, we obtain the following identity:
Consequently, the limits
exist and satisfy
Thus, from (3.13), we deduce that
Let M > 0 be such that |F (s)| ≤ M a.e. in R. Let us show that, for some C only depending on
In fact, from standard energy estimates, since F ∈ L ∞ (Q), we have
Using the PDEs in (3.13), we also get the following:
Let us first assume that y 0 ∈ H 1 0 (Ω). The idea is to find r and s such that
where r and s are the conjugate of r and s, respectively. This will make possible to bound from above the last integral in (3.16) .
. For this reason, it is natural to ask for which values of α and β the following embedding holds:
By interpolation, we have that, for each 0 < θ < 1, (3.18) holds when
Taking α = 2r and β = 2s , we conclude that r = α/(α − 2) and s = αN/2(α + 2).
. Using the regularity results of the heat equation and the fact that 
H1 .
This proves (3.15) in this case. Now, let us assume that we only have y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω). As in the first situation, the idea is to find r and s such that (3.17) holds. Since the regularity of η does not depend on the data y 0 , we still have
, where α and β are as above. In this case, we have by
, whereā ≥ 2 and b = 2Nā/(āN − 4). Using again parabolic regularity, we get
Since this holds if and only if N ≤ 12, the estimate (3.15) is also proved in this case. Taking into account (3.14) and (3.15), we see that
Note that the previous constant C can be chosen independent of μ 1 and μ 2 . In a similar way, it can be shown that, under the previous assumptions on y 0 and N ,
for another constant C independent of μ 1 and μ 2 .
It is now clear that, for sufficiently large μ 1 and μ 2 , the couple (v 1 , v 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of (1.4).
The case with restrictions
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1.5. We return to the Stackelberg-Nash null controllability problem for a linear parabolic PDE, but we impose some restrictions: the followers (v 1 , v 2 ) are supposed to minimize the functionals (1.2) subject to the convex constraints v i ∈ U i (i = 1, 2), where the U i are given by (1.12) . This is a more difficult problem. The search of a pair (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfying (1.4), where the minimizations are performed in U 1,d and U 2,d , is equivalent to the following:
As in Section 2, with the change of variable z = y −ȳ, we are led to a null controllability problem. Then, we see that (4.1)-(4.2) is equivalent to
where w i is the derivative of z with respect tov i in the direction v i , that is to say, the solution to
The adjoint system associated to (4.4) is given by
Replacing the equation satisfied by φ i in (4.3), we obtain
Now, by introducing the projectors
, we see that (4.5) can be rewritten equivalently in the form
We may group all this information to get the following system:
Let us prove that, under the assumptions (2.7), for each f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )) there exists exactly one solution to (4.6), i.e. there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (
. Indeed, notice that (4.5) can also be rewritten in the form
where L and Ψ are respectively given by (2.4) and (2.6). If μ 1 and μ 2 satisfy (2.7), L is a coercive continuous bilinear form on H, whence (4.7) is uniquely solvable. Furthermore, it is clear that the couple (v 1 , v 2 ) and the associated state z satisfy (again) the estimates (2.9) and (2.10). As in the semilinear case, we will analyze and solve the null controllability problem for (4.6) by a fixed-point method. To this end, note that the projectors P U i,d are given as follows:
, where P i : R → I i is the usual projector on the interval I i . Also, note that, for every k ∈ H i , P U i,d can be written in the form
Therefore, the controllability problem is reduced to find f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )) such that the solution to
), satisfies (2.2). But this can be done easily.
Indeed, for each couple (
The arguments in Sections 2.2 and 3.2 can be applied again to (4.9). The main consequence is that there exists exactly one minimal L 2 norm null control f for this system with
and, also, z, φ 1 and φ 2 uniformly bounded in
. Hence, it is not difficult to deduce that the mapping (φ 1 ,φ 2 ) → (φ 1 , φ 2 ) possesses at least one fixed-point. Such a fixed-point satisfies, together with some f and some z, (4.8) and (2.2). This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.5.
Some additional comments and questions
On the assumption O
The assumption (1.10) is used in (2.20) 2,d . However, this is the case if we modify appropriately the secondary functionals J i . In fact, let ρ * = ρ * (x, t) be a weight (a positive continuous function on Ω × (0, T )) such that ρ * ≥ e sσ/2 , see (2.18). We assume now that the followers produce a Nash equilibrium with respect to the functionals
With computations similar to those in Section 2.1, we obtain the following optimality system: 
Stackelberg-Nash controllability and Stokes and Navier-Stokes systems
With functionals J and J i similar to those in the previous sections, we can formulate again the StackelbergNash null controllability problem for (5. For other controllability results for Stokes and Navier-Stokes systems, see [6, [8] [9] [10] 12 ].
Other Stackelberg strategies
It is possible to introduce other strategies to control systems of the kind (1.1). One of them is the so called Stackelberg-Pareto method.
For each f ∈ L 2 (O × (0, T )), we can associate one or several Pareto equilibrium pairs (u 1 (f ), u 2 (f )) ∈ H. By definition, this means that there is no (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ H satisfying
one of these inequalities at least being strict. Then, we search for f such that the states y associated to f and the (u 1 (f ), u 2 (f )) satisfy (1.9), where y = y(x, t) is a prescribed uncontrolled solution to (1.1). The analysis of Stackelberg-Pareto controllability will be the goal of a forthcoming paper.
